基于演化博弈的日前市场发电侧竞价演化稳定性分析
李昕儒1，刘传清2，仲佳佳2，张潮2，陆尧3
（1 南京三新供电服务有限公司浦口分公司，江苏 南京 211800；2 南京工程学院 电力工程学院，江苏 南京 211167；
3 南京禄口空港新城建设发展有限公司，江苏 南京 211113）
摘 要：随着电力现货市场售电侧的开放程度逐渐扩大，发电商直接参与售电，通过竞价上网参与市场竞争。根据发电商发电规模的差异，应用演化博弈中的多群体复制动态博弈模型对发电商的竞价策略进行建模，利用雅可比矩阵讨论模型的均衡点和稳定性，并结合政府监管方对竞价结果的影响，定量分析参数的变化对演化稳定的影响。仿真结果表明，多群体复制动态博弈模型能较充分地反映出发电商竞价的动态过程，并反映发电商在面对不同的政府调控措施下的报价策略，只有合理的竞价规则才能保证用电用户获得价格低廉的电力，并保证发电商自身的利益。
关键词：日前市场；演化博弈论；发电商；竞价策略
中图分类号：F407.6；TM73 文献标识码：A 文章编号：1007-3175(2020)10-0008-05
Evolutionary Stability Analysis of Generation Side Bidding in Day-Ahead Market
Based on Evolutionary Game Theory
LI Xin-ru1, LIU Chuan-qing2, ZHONG Jia-jia2, ZHANG Chao2, LU Yao3
（1 Pukou Branch of Nanjing Sanxin Power Supply Service Co., Ltd, Nanjing 211800, China;
2 School of Electric Power Engineering, Nanjing Institute of Technology, Nanjing 21116 7, China;
3 Nanjing Lukou International Airport New Town Construction & Development Co., Ltd, Nanjing 211113 , China）
Abstract: With the gradual expansion of the opening degree of the electricity selling side of the spot electricity market, the power producers directly participate in the electricity sales and participate in the market competition through bidding.Considering that power generation companies expect to achieve profit maximization through the optimal bidding strategy. According to the difference of power generation scale, the multi group replication dynamic game model in evolutionary game is applied to model the bidding strategy of power generation companies. Using Jacobian matrix to discuss the equilibrium point and stability of the model, combined with the influence of government regulators on the bidding results, quantitative analysis of the impact of parameter changes on evolutionary stability.Only reasonable bidding rules can ensure that power consumers can obtain low-cost electricity and ensure the interests of power producers.Simulation results show that multiple population copy dynamic game model can fully reflect the dynamic process of electricity bidding, and to reflect electricity generators in the face of the bidding strategies under different government regulation and control measures, only reasonable bidding rules can ensure that power consumers can obtain low-cost electricity, and guarantee the generation company's own interests.
Key words: day-ahead market; evolutionary game theory; power generation company; bidding strategy
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